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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
- vs. ROY LEE POE,

Case No.
10716

Defendant-Appellant.
-------

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
--------

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
Appellant was convicted of the crime of murder
in the first degree in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-30-3 (1953). The Honorable C. Nelson Day presided over appellant's jury trial in the Fifth Judicial
District Court of Washington County, State of Utah,
and, because of the absence of a jury recommendation of leniency, appellant was sentenced to be executed.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On January 14, 1966, appellant was arraigned in

th8 district court of the Fifth Judicial District, Wash-

ington County, State of Utah. on the charge of mur-
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der in the first degree. At arraignment, appellant
entered a plea of not guilty. A jury trial resulted ir,
a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree and,
no recommendation for leniency being made by the
jury, the Honorable C. Nelson Day passed sentence ·
that the appellant be executed. The Honorable C.
Nelson Day has ordered a stay of execution pending
the appeal to this court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Respondent submits that the conviction should
be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Respondent basically agrees with appellant's
chronological summation of the evidence adduced
at appellant's jury trial. An additional factor that
must be noted is that the prosecution contended
and the evidence verified the fact that at the time of
death, the deceased was reclined on a bed with his
head propped up by a pillow and his hands folded
across his chest, sound asleep (T.339, 738-739).
However, certain characterizations of the nature
of the evidence containerl. in appellant's brief are
repudiated by respondent and, because these characterizations constitute part of appellant's legal arqument, respondent will rebut them in the followim
arguments.
As to the facts relative to the composition of the
jury, those prospective jurors acquainted with wit- '
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ness<::s for the pro:--:ecution, those acquainted with
the d2ceased ulX~ h~s brother, those acquainted with
the prosecutors, those acquainted with the defendant. the pr2trial opinions, discussions, and exposure to p~rported facts and the community attitudes as
contained in appell:mt's brief, respondent submits
that such matters are relevant and material only so
far as those matters relate to the legal points raised
on appeal. Therefore, respondent will limit its discussion to these points to the extent that they relate
to the legal issues.
However, as a preliminary matter, it must be
noted that in a community the size of St. George,
\V ashington County, Utah, it is only natural that the
cti;:>:enry will be acquainted with the county sheriff,
c'-;unty attorney, and other public officials chosen
to represent them. It is also natural the individuals
of the community are well acquainted with each
other and know and discuss events as they relate
to th2 communi~y.
Appellant olso neglects to advise the court that
.:,n examination of the record indicates that most,
if not all, of the prospective jurors knew and respE:ccted appellant's trial counsel. Although the
b11·_:_3thy narrat!on set forth on pages 8 through 16 of
·1~1;_)ellant's brief are evidently intended to serve as
a founddtion for pomt two of appellant's argumern,
1l rnus~ be recognized and admitted that at no time,
c~1tlKn at the pretrial stages or at the trial stage itself,
did '1pµellant move for a chJ.nge of venue, a contin-

4
uance, or any other procedural method availabh
to an accused to insure a fair trial.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY ALLOWING THE
WASHINGTON COUNTY SHERIFF TO BE
SWORN AS BAILIFF AND TAKE CUSTODY
OF THE JURY DURING THE DELIBERATIONS OF THE JURY AFTER THE SHERIFF
HAD TESTIFIED AS A WITNESS FOR THE
PROSECUTION.

After both the prosecution and defense had
given their closing arguments, the trial court called
forth Evan G. Whitehead, Sheriff, Washington County, Utah, and the sheriff was then sworn by the clerk
of the court as bailiff (T. 765. 766). The jury then in
the custody of Sheriff Whitehead, retired to deliberate their verdict. Although no objection was made
at the time Sheriff Whitehead was sworn as bailiif
and custodian of the jury, appelland now argues
that such action constituted prejudicial error requiring reversal of his conviction.
Prior to Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965),
it was clear that in the absence of an actual showing of preiudice, an officer such as a sheriff could
also act as bailiff notwithstanding the fact that the
officer had been produced as a witness for the prosecution and had given testimony in that regard.
53 Am. Jur.Trial § 858, at 625 (1941); 5 Wharton, Criminal and Procedure § 2109, at 290 n.2 (1957). In Odell
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v. Hudspeth, 189 F.2d 300 (10th Cir. 1951), it was
ci lleqed to constitute prejudicial error for a sheriff,
d prosecuting witness, to also act as bailiff.
The
court, in holding the contention to be without merit,
stu ted at 189 F.2d 303, ". . . There is no evidence
that th2 sheriff did anything irregular in performing
this function." See alsoNewby v. State, 188 Pac. 124
(Okla. 1920); Watson v. State, 197 S.W.2d 1018 (Tex.
l 946).
Appellant relies strongly on Turner v. Louisiana,
supra, for the proposition that an accused need not
show actual prejudice resulting from the situation
whereby a prosecution witness acts as bailiff, but
thCJ.t such a relationship is so inherently prejudicial
as to constitute a denial of due process. Because of
this strong reliance on Turner v. Louisiana, supra,
is it necessary to completely understand the circumstances that existed in that case. Turner was charged
with murder committed during the course of a robLery (379 U.S. 466). During the course of the trial,
two deputy sheriffs, considered "principle witnesses
for the prosecution," (379 U.S. 467), were called to
tPstify. One of the deputy sheriffs testified as to:
. . . IC [ertain damaging admissions which he said
had been made bv Turner at the time of his apprehension. In addition, Simmons rthe deputy J described the circumstances under which he said he
had later prevailed upon Turner to make a written
confession. This confession was introduced in evidence. (879 U.S. 467).

The issue as to whether the defendant had volUlltaril y given the confession was raised, and on
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the strength of the testimony of the two deputy
sheriffs, was resolved against the defendant.
The necessity and credibility of the deputies
testimony was obviously a vital cog in the prosecution's proof of Turner's guilt. As stated by the Court
at 379 U.S. 473:
It is to be emphasized that the testimony of [the
deputies l was not confined to so:ne uncontroverted
or merely formal aspect of the case for the prosecution. On the contrflry, the credibility which the jury
attached to the testimony of these two key witnesses must inevitably have determined whether Wayne
Turner was to be sentenced to his death.

The nature of the association between the deputies and the jury was described by the Court at 379
U.S. 468:
The deputies drove the jurors to a restaurant for
each meal, and to their lodgings each night. The
deputies ate with them. conversed with them, and
did errands for them.

The Court further stated at 379 U.S. 473:
We deal here not with a brief encounter, but with a
continuous and intimate association throughout a
three-day trial- m1 association which gave these
witnesses an opportunity, as Simmons put it, to renew old friendships and make new acquaintances
ar;iong the '.".1ember of the jury.

Under these circumstances, the Court concluded at 379 U.S. 473:
. . . it would be blinking- reality not to recognize the extreme prejudice inherent in this contin-
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ual association throughout the trial between the
jurors and these two key witnesses for the prosecution.

A brief examination of the testimony given by
Sheriff Whitehead in the instant case reveals that
the sheriff's testimony was not of such a nature as
to bring the case within the confines of Turner v.
Louisiana. supra. Briefly, the sheriff testified that he
arrived at the scene of the crime at approximately
2:00 p.m., on November 9, 1965 (T. 374, 375). The
house of the deceased and its location were described (T. 359-379) and the sheriff then related how
he conducted a short investigative search of the
premises (T. 380). During the course of his testimony,
the sheriff also identified plaintiff's exhibits, 4, 5, 6,
7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17 ('f. 380 - 391),
which are pictures of the deceased's house, the interior of the house, and the interior of the room
wherein the deceased was discovered. The sheriff
also testified that he subsequently came into contact with one Vern Phillips, who brought two guns,
one a twenty-two caliber rifle which was alleged to
be the murder weapon, to the sheriff at his office
(T. 397, 398). A brief narrative was then given as to
the sheriff taking the appellant into custody in Las
Vegas, Nevada, on November 3, 1965, and returning
appellant to St. George, Washington County, Utah
(T. 401, 402). The sheriff did not testify as to any conversation that may have occurred between the appellant and the sheriff during the time the appellant was being transported back to St. George, Utah.
As a matter of fact, at no time did the sheriff testify
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as to any conversation transpiring between himself
and the appellant.
It is obvious from a brief review of the testimony
of Sheriff Whitehead that the sheriff's testimony
was not a necessary element in the prosecution's
case as in Turner v. touisiana, supra. The sheriff's
testimony was confined to uncontroverted and
merely formal aspects of the prosecution's case.
Therefore, on this basis alone, Turner v. Louisiana,
supra, would not be applicable.
Several cases since Turner v. Louisiana, supra,
have considered the point now pursued by appellant and have concluded that Turner v. Louisiana,
supra, did not apply. Ex parte Bertsch, 395 S.W.2d
620 (Tex. 1965). In Bryant v. State, 397 S.W.2d 445,
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 858 (Tex. 1965), the sheriff acted
in capacity of bailiff and the defendant relied on Turner v. Louisiana, supra.
The court recognized the fact that the defendant
made no objection at the time the sheriff took custody of the jury, hut at the hearing, because of the
claim denial of due process, stated at 397 S.W.2d
452, " ... we have examined the record and find no
merit in such contention." Also, in Jackson v. State,
403 S.W.2d 145, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 938 (Tex. 1966),
the court stated at 403 S.\V.2d 148:
The nature and extent of the association of the
Sheriff with the jury and his testimony pertaining
to the case, did not reveal such association or communication with the jury as would call for a reversal under Turner.
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See also Whisman v. State, 221 Ga. 460, 145
S.E.2d 499 (1965).
The case of Bowles v. State, 366 F.2d 734 (5th
Cir. 1966), also involved a murder conviction. As to

rho relationship between the prosecution witnesses
cJ.nd the jury, the court stated at 366 F.2d 736:
Except when they were in the courtroom or deliberating, the sheriff or his deputies were in attendance
upon the jury at all times .... As a necessary consc:quence, the sheriff came into contact with the jury
on several occasions during the long trial. It was inevitable that he do so.

The court further stated at 366 F.2d 736 n. 3:
Although we are mindful of the Supreme Court's
admonition in Turner v. State of Louisiana . .. that
such contact oul!ht not be condoned, we feel that in
the circumstances of this case we are not 'blinking
I at l reality' in finding the contact non-prejudicial.

It was considered to be the merest pedantry to
insist on strict procedural regularity when the lapse
therefrom did not result in any harm or preiudicG
1o the accused. In recognizing the impossibility of
such strict procedural regularity, the court stated at
366 F.2d 738:
In rural areas. almost necessarily, this same officer
Ithe sheriff I will come into contact with the jury
in the normal course of a trial. It is often his duty
to escort the jury to meals and to stand guard durin r their dP\ihcr:1tions. To assert that Turner requires the invalidation of all convictions in which
formal testimonv was used is too narrow a construction of its .tPachings and rationale. The dual
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role which the sheriff's duties sometimes require
of him presents an ever-present and inherent danger
of running afoul of the strictures of Turner and
should be avoided when possible. However, the mere
existence of contact between the sheriff and
the jurors resulting from the performance of prefunctory duties required by law and the orderly conduct of court is not sufficient in and of itself to invalidate the conviction. \Ve find that the performance by the sheriff of his judicial administrative
functions required by state law in the circumstances
and under the facts presented in this case does not
require the invalidation of the conviction.

Appellant overlooks the impropriety and effect
of the statements made by the bailiff to certain jurors
in Parker v. Gladden, 87 Sup.Ct. 468 (1966). These
statements were, "Oh, that wicked fellow [ petitioner J, he is guilty," (87 Sup.Ct. 470), and statement2
to the effect that the state supreme court would correct any error if the jury should find the defendant
guilty (87 Sup.Ct. 470). Also, the fact that the jury
deliberated for twenty-six hours, showing disagreement, and the fact that one juror testified that she
had been prejudiced by the statements of the bailiff,
contributed in no small part to the decision of the
United States Supreme Court.
The Utah cases cited by appellant are clearly
distinguishable. For example, in State v. Anderson.
65 Utah 415, 237 Pac. 941 (1925), a prosecuting witness had given a substantial favor to a juror thereby
creating an indebtedness from the juror to the witness and the prosecution. This activity also occurred
on more than one occasion. In State v. Crank, 105
Utah 332, 152 P.d 178 (1943), the court granted a new
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trial on other grounds and was not required to determine whether the conduct such as the conversation between the juror and the witness immediately
prior to submission of the case to the jury alone constituted qrounds for reversal.
Respondent submits that the proper Utah position is stated in State v. Hines, 6 Utah 2d 126, 307 P.2d
887 (1957), wherein this court stated at 307 P.2d 889:
It is further to be observed that the reporter is an
officer of the court, fully acquainted with court procedures and the proper conduct of jurors. Requesting her to accompany the lady jurors was done as a
precaution by the judge that the privacy of the jury
be assured. In the absence of any indication of impropriety, to assume that some irregularity occurred
which prevented the defendants from having a fair
trial, would require us to indulge in conjecture.
This is neither warranted under the circumstances,
nor within our prerogative should we desire to do so.
[Emphasis added. J

Also, this court stated in State v. Rivenburgh, l l
Utah 2d 95, 355 P.2d 680, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 922
(1960), at 11Utah2d l 12:
Where separation of [the] j u r y i s f o r
I the J purpose of necessity, under surveillance of
bailiff, and there is no communication within a
juror, prejudice will not be presumed and the burden is on the defendant to establish that he is prejudiced by the alleged separation.

The court further stated at 11 Utah 2d 112:
In the instant case . . . no evidence was adduced
that anyone conversed with the juror during the
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deliberation. No prejudice being shown by the defendant, the contention of separation of the jury is
not well taken. [Emphasis added J.

Respondent submits that the facts and testimony
of Sheriff Whitehead in the instant case preclude
the applicability of the inherently prejudice rule
set forth in Turner v. Louisiana, supra. Subsequent
cases that not strictly apply the rationale of that case
must be considered together with the failure of appellant to voice any objection at the time Sheriff
Whitehead was sworn in as bailiff. Therefore, appellant's contention in this regard is without merit.
POINT II
APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED A FAIR
TRIAL AS A RESULT OF THE COMMUNITY
PATTERN OF THOUGHT AS EXPRESSED BY
POTENTIAL JURORS AND AS A RESULT OF
THE PR 0 XI MIT Y OF RELATIONSHIPS
WHICH EXISTED BETWEEN MEMBERS OF
THE .JURY AND WITNESSES FOR THE
PROSECUT10N, THE VICTIM, THE PROSECUTORS, AND THE DEFENDANT.

Appellant, for the first time, now seeks to invalidate his conviction on the grounds that he was
denied a fair trial because of a pattern of community
thought that existed against him. This argument is
analogous in reasoning and application of precedent to a claimed denial of a fair trial due to adverse pretrial publicity. In support of this position,
appellant relies on Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961 ).
However, appellant fails to fully recognize that Irvin
v. Dowd did not require complete isolation of a prospective juror from life and the accompanying mediu
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of communication. As stated by the United States
Supreme Court at 366 U.S. 722:
It is not required, however. that the jurors be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved. In
these days of swift, widespread and diverse methods
of communication, an important case can be expected to arouse the interest of the public in the vicinity, and scaiTely an:v of those best qualified to serve
as jurnrs will not have formed some impression or
opinion as to the merits of the case. This is particularly true in criminal cases. To hold that the mere
existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt
or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebuke the presumption of a prospective
juror's impartiality would be to establish an impossible standard. It i'l sufficient if the juror can lay
aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict
based on the evidence presented in court.

One important preliminary consideration to be
given the issue now raised by appellant is that a
wide degree of d1scretion is vested in a trial court
in determining whether an impartial jury may be
obtained. This determination should not be overruled unless it may clearly be shown that the trial
court abused its discretion. Annot., Pretrial Publicity
in Criminal Case as Affecting Defendant's Right to
Fair Trial-Federal Cases, 10 L.Ed.2d 1243, § 6 (a), at
1266 (1964).
Appellant does not single out or rely on any
one occurrence to justify a conclusion that the trial
court abused its discretion in determining the reliability of the responses of the prospective jurors.
Rather, appellant attempts to point to various simi-

larities allegedly existing between the instant case
and Irvin v. Dowd, supra. However, the only similarity between the two cases is that both trials were
held in small communities.
The record clearly indicates that appellant
failed to utilize several methods devised to insure
him a fair and impartial trial. For example, where adverse pretrial publicity or a communal pattern of
thought exists so as to deprive a defendant of a fair
trial, several methods, including a motion for a
change of venue, a continuance, a dismissal, a
change of venire or a challenge for cause, either
singly or collectively applied to the jury panel, may
be invoked by the defendant. In the instant case, th9
record is devoid of any such motions on the part of
appellant and clearly indicates that the jury panel
was passed for cause by the defendant (R. 275).
In light of the appellant's failure to invoke the
above enumerated methods of insuring a fair and
impartial trial, appellant may not now raise the issue
on appeal. Latham v. Crouse, 320 F.2d 120 (10th Cir.
1963). wherein the court stated at 320 F.2d 123:
In the case before us the record discloses that prior
to the exercise of any peremptory challenges, defense counsel passed all jurors for cause. Be that as
it may, the claim of jury prejudice because of the
telecast was not presented to the trial court and
hence is not before us for review.

In Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430 (1887), the United
States Supreme Court held that the trial court did
not err in refusing to excuse a juror who had read
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a newspaper report of the case, but who stated that
he was not conscious of any bias or prejudice so as
to prevent him from being fair and impartial and
that he could try the case on the evidence adduced
in court.
The same situation exists in the instant case.
The trial court, believing the assertions of the prospecfrre jurors that the defendant could receive a
fair and impartial trial, did not abuse its discretion.
Every prospective juror was fully questioned regarding any preconceived bias or prejudice that
would prevent him from being fair and impartial.
Defense counsel had the opportunity to voir dire. In
light of the record, including appellant's passing of
the jury panel for cause, no error exists which would
give merit to appellant's claim.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN ALLOWING C E RT A IN
COLORED SLIDES OF THE AUTOPSY OF THE
DECEASED TO BE INTRODUCED INTO EVIDENCE.

It must be conceded that the admissibility of
photographs is a matter of judicial discretion and
the finding of the trial court will not be disturbed
unless it is clearly shown that the discretion has
been abused. Potts v. People. 114 Colo. 253, 158 P.2d
739 (1945); Martinez v. People. 124 Colo. 170, 235 P.2d
810 (1951); 17 Okla. L. Rev. 33 (1964); 40 Texas L. Rev.
284 (1961).
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The standard generally applied to the admissibility of photographs was set forth by the Supreme
Court of Colorado in Potts v. People, supra. wherein the court stated at 158 P.2d 740:
They are not inadmissible merely because they
bring vividly to the jurors the details of a shocking crime or tend to arouse passion or prejudice ....
It is only when photographs do not illustrate or
make clear some issue of the case, and when they
are of such a character as to prejudice the jury, that
they are not admissible.

Appellant alleges that the photographs admitted into evidence in the instant case were not necessary because there was no question as to the death
of the deceased or as to the cause of the death. (Appellant's brief, p.40). However, appellant neglects
to recognize that the entire entry of a plea of not
guilty puts in issue every ma.terial allegation of the
information or indictment. Utah Code Ann. § 77-24-4
(1953). Therefore, to establish appellant's guilt of the
crime of murder in the first degree, the prosecution
was required to prove all of the elements of murder
in the first degree including the fact of death and
the fact that the death was caused by and through
the willful, deliberate, malicious and premeditated
act or acts of the accused.
The autopsy slides corroborated the testimony
of Dr. LeCheminant who testified that at the autopsy,
he recovered metal fragments from the skull of the
deceased (T. 437, 438), traced the paths of the two
wounds received by the deceased (T. 440), and con-
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eluded tha_t the sole cause of death of the deceased
was due to gunshot wounds to the head (T. 441).
The metal fragments recovered by Dr. LeChemina.nt were later identified by a firearms expert fro:;n
the Federal Bureau of Investigation as being fired
from the twenty-two caliber rifle, exhibit P-28, alleged by the prosecution to be the murder weapon
(T. 493). The doctor's testimony also verified the sole
cause of death and the fact that the death was precipita_ted by and through a criminal act. Also, by
tracing the paths of the death-dealing bullets, the
testimony verified the fact that the deceased was
lving down when he was shot, thus establishing the
malicious intent and premeditation of the perpetrator of the crime. The essence of the recovery of the
bullet fragments and subsequent linkage to the alleged murder weapon is obvious.
In Potts v. People, supra, the court stated at 158
P.2d 740:
Photographs are the pictured expression of data
observed by a witness. They are often more accurate
than any description by words, and give a clearer
comprehension of the physical facts than can be
obtained from the testimony of witnesses. Ordinarily photographs are competent evidence of anything
which it is competent for a witness to describe in
words.

In State v. Johnson, 57 N.M. 716, 263 P.2d 282

(1953), the Supreme Court of New Mexico consid-

l"JE?d a first degree murder conviction wherein the
issue as to the admissibility of autopsy photographs
Wcts raised. The court stated at 263 P.2d 284, 285:
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It is argued that the court erred in the admission of certain photographs. The photographs show
the scalp had been removed from the skull of the
deceased, exposing fractures of the skull and certain
fleshy part of the head and shoulders of the deceased. The objection made is that the pictures are
so gruesome and inflammatory, the minds of the jurors were prejudiced thereby. We do not so appraise
them. While the doctor testified in terms descriptive
of the wounds, the photographs gave the jury a visual explanation of his testimony. It must be remembered that appellant was standing on his plea of not
guilty when the photographs were admitted. The
state was put to the task of proving the essential
elements of the crime. Whether the deceased was
fatally injured was an issue to be determined by the
jury. The extent and nature of the wound and the
atrocity of the crime also were material questions.
Clearly, the photographs, though cumulative, served to corroborate the doctor's testimony and were
admissible for that purpose.

The court concluded that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in allowing the introduction of
the autopsy photographs.
Appellant's argument also fails to recognize the
procedure employed by the trial court in determining the admissibility of the autopsy photographs.
The records clearly disclose that the trial court admonished and excused the jury and then proceeded
to view the photographs in the presence of the prosecution and appellant and his counsel before proceeding (T. 422-427). Appellant objected on the
grounds that the body depicted in the photographs
was not properly identified as the body of the deceased. No objection to the admissibility of the
photographs was made on the grounds that they
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were gruesome and would tend to arouse the passion and prejudice of the jury against appellant.
Also, appellant's inference that auotpsy photographs are inadmissible merely because of the admittedly distasteful event which they reproduce is
clearly erroneous. Potts v. People, supra; Martinez
v. People, supra; State v. Johnson, supra.
Appellant's reference to State v. Russell, 106
Utah 116, 145 P.2d 1003 (1944), does not support appellant's position. This court stated at 145 P.2d 1010:
There is no merit in the other errors assigned. The
pictures of the deceased, taken after her death and
showing her wounds, were clearly admissible. Even
though the defendant did admit the killing, he did
not admit the intent to kill and the nature of the
wounds may be material on that point. The pictures
showed the nature of the wounds more clearly than
the testimony of witnesses.

Respondent submits that the autopsy photographs admitted into evidence in the instant case
clearly met the established standards governing
such admissibility, and appellant has failed to show
a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court in allowing the introduction of the photographs. This court should not disturb the decision
of the trial court.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN ADVISING THE JURY
AS TO THE CONTACT THE TRIAL COURT
HAD WITH A WITNESS FOR THE PROSE-
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CUTION PRIOR TO THE WITNESS' TESTIFYING IN THE INSTANT CASE.

Respondent accepts appellant's general statement that all issues of fact are to be submitted to the
jury and that the trial court should, neither expressly
nor by implication, indicate its opinion as to the facts
or the weight to be given the evidence. State v. Harris, 1 Utah 2d 264 P.2d 284 (1953). Respondent submits, however, that the comments made to the jury
by the trial court regarding Delton Ray Nance, a
witness for the prosecution, were not comments
bearing on the credibility of Mr. Nance or the weight
to be given Mr. Nance's testimony. Rather, the comments merely clarified an inference raised by defense counsel which was incorrect and improper.
To adequately understand the trial court's comments
as they occurred, it is necessary to quote at length
from the transcript, pages 725-726:
Q. After this conversation that you said you had
with Mr. Poe, where you placed on probation?
A.

Yes sir.

Q. By whom?
A.

By the court.

Q. Which court?
A.

The court here.

THE COURT: I placed him on probation, Mr.
Morris.

Q.

When was that done?

A.

I was placed on probation in December.
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After the above questions were propounded to
the witness by counsel for appellant, the court summoned both the prosecution and counsel for appellant to the bench where an off the record discussion took place. The court then stated:
Gentlemen of the jury, before commenting to you
on this matter very briefly, I have discussed the
matter with counsel up here at the bench. When
Mr. Nance was questioned by counsel with regard
to his being in the cell with Mr. Poe or conversations he had with Mr. Poe, this was the first I had
ever heard of the matter. I am the judge who placed
Mr. Nance on probation and I placed him on probation I don't remember when but some months ago
under the supervision and direction of the Adult
Probation and Parole Department of the State of
Utah. Mr. Alan Keller is the agent of that office
who works out of Provo and has general supervision over Mr. Nance and other probationers in the
Fifth District. I know Mr. Keller requires probationers to report to the sheriff's office each month
and have them cosign their monthly reports each
month; and I assume while Mr. Nance was in Washington County that he reported to the sheriff's office here for that purpose. Mr. Nance, it is true,
is it not, that Mr. Keller is your probation officer?
THE WITNESS:
ficer.

Yes, sir, he is my probation of-

THE COURT:
I want it clear that I have never
heard about any connection with Mr. Nance and
the Poe case until this afternoon when you were on
the stand. Mr. Burns, I understand that you are
through with this witness, then?

It is obvious by the trial court's comments to the
jury that the trial court was merely rectifying the
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incorrect inference drawn by counsel for the defendant that the witness received probation because
of his statement relating to the instant case. The
court, based on its own knowledge of the witness
and the witness' case and subsequent probation,
knew this inference to be incorrect. The trial court,
as the court that placed the witness on probation,
was justified in advising the jury that the probation
given the witness was independent of any connection the witness had to the instant case. This is so
because the trial court knew, by his own knowledge, that this was the case.
A witness testifying on behalf of an accused is
entitled to a proper reflection of his character and
credibility before the jury. If the prosecution raises
an inference detrimental to this image which is improper and incorrect and one which the trial court,
based on its own knowledge and familiarity with
the witness, knows to be incorrect, the witness and
the accused are entitled to the trial court's correction
of the adverse implication. For the trial court not to
speak out and correct the record would be tantamount to suppression of evidence favorable to the
accused. The prosecution and its witnesses are no
less entitled to this protection.
Also, it must be acknowledged that the explanatory comments by the trial court to the jury followed
an off the record discussion of the matter between
the trial court, the prosecution and defense counsel.
At the time the comments were made to the jury by
the trial court, no objection was interposed by defense counsel.
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A comparison of the facts of the instant case
and the comments made by the trial court in State v.
Harris, supra, reveals the inapplicability of State v.
Harris. supra. In the instant case, the trial court did
not comment on the testimony of Mr. Nance nor did
the trial court indicate his belief as to the credibility
of Mr. Nance. Rather, the trial court merely corrected
the adverse inference made by defense counsel that
the witness' probation resulted from the willingness
of the witness to testify in the instant case. In State
v. Harris, supra, the trial court limited the jury's deliberations to whether a record of a prior conviction
was authentic and then proceeded to comment on
the authenticity of the record. The court indicated
\·hat the authenticity of the record could be doubted
only if the jury concluded that a witness for the
prosecution had committed perjury. The facts are
clearly distinguishable.
In the instant case, the trial court, in instruction
No. 28, instructed the jury:
In determining the facts or any fact in this case
you should not consider nor be influenced by any
statement made or act done by the court which you
may interpret as indicating its views thereon. You
are the sole and final judges of all questions of fact
submitted to you, and you must determine such
questions for yourselves from the evidence and without regard to what you believe the court thinks
thereon. The court had not intended to express,
or intimidate, or be understood as giving any opinion on what the proof shows or does not show, or
what are or what are not the facts in the case. And
it is immaterial what the court thinks thereon. You
as jurors must follow your own views and not be
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influenced by the views of the court. If any act or
expression of mine has seemed to indicate an opinion relating to any of these matters, you are instructed to disregard it entirely.

Therefore, the corrective instruction given to
the jury by the trial court as set forth above eradicates any prejudice which the appellant may now
claim.
POINT V
THERE IS NO CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF
ERRORS JUSTIFYING A REVERSAL IN THE
INSTANT CASE.

The dactrine announced in State v. St. Clair. 3
Utah 2d 230, 282 P.2d 323 (1955), that in some instances errors, which when standing alone would
not justify reversal, may have such a cumulative
effect so as to deprive the accused of a fair trial, is
not disputed by respondent. However, respondent
submits that the instant case does not meet the degree of error and criteria set forth in State v. St. Clair.
supra. The duty of the appellate court is set forth
in 3 Utah 2d 244:
On the basis of such appraisal, if the court can say
with assurance that the evidence of the defendant's
guilt was so clear and convicing that no reasonable
jury could be expected to return a different verdict,
even in the absence of the irregularities, then the
errors would be harmless and the verdict should be
permitted to stand. On the other hand, if there is a
reasonable liklihood that in the absence of the
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errors a different verdict might have been rendered,
a new trial should be granted. [emphasis added].

In the instant case; there is no cumulation of
errors so as to justify a_ conclusion that a different
verdict would have been reached by the jury in
the absence of such errors. In State v. St. Clair,
supra, the cumulation of errors supported this
court's finding that it was reasonably likely the verdict of the jury would have been different but for
the errors. However, the alleged errors in the instant case do not justify such a conclusion. There is
no indication that the appellant did not receive a
fair trial because he was tried in St. George, Washington County, Utah. Appellant now submits that
the failure of the jury to recommend leniency is evidence of a prejudicial impact on the jurors as argued
in appellant's brief. (Appellant's brief p. 48). This
argument totally ignores the senseless manner by
which the deceased, while asleep, was shot in the
face twice by a twenty-two caliber single action rifle
at close range. The failure of the jury to recommend
leniency cannot be traced to any prejudicial error
as alleged by appellant, but rather, is directly traceable to the bestial manner by which the deceased
was murdered. It was not a community pattern of
thought that resulted in appellant's conviction. The
conviction resulted from a commendable presentation of the state's evidence by the prosecution from
which only one conclusion could be drawn, namely,
that the appellant with the requisite intent, did in
fact murder another human being. To now say that
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the appellant was convicted because he committed
his crime in a community where he was a stranger
is to ignore the basic principles on which a jury system is predicated.
To conclude that a cumulation of errors has precluded appellant from having a fair trial first necessitates a conclusion that errors were committed. Respondent submits that this is not the case and that
State v. St. Clair, supra, is clearly distinguishable.
Respondent submits that this court should follow State v. Sinclair. 15 Utah 2d 163, 389 P.2d 469
(1964), wherein it is stated at 15 Utah 2d 170:
Under our statute [Utah Code Ann. § 77-42-1
(1953) ], which requires that errors which do not
affect the essential rights of the parties be disregarded, we cannot properly interfere with the jury's
verdict, unless upon a review of the whole case it
should appear that there was error of sufficient
gravity that the defendant's rights were prejudiced
in some substantial way. We have found nothing of
any such consequence here. [Emphasis added].

Respondent submits that a review of the whole
record requires a conclusion that the appellant received a fair trial and that no error was committed
that prejudiced appellant in a substantial way.
CONCLUSION
It is obvious that the jury was clearly convinced
from the evidence adduced at the trial of appellant's
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The record substan-
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tiates and necessitates a conclusion that no error
was committed that resulted in a substantial prejudice to appellant. Therefore, respondent submits
that appellant's contentions are wholly without
merit and that the conviction be affirmed.
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